Rhode Island Supreme Court Upholds Broad Immunity for Bodily Injury Action

In a decision issued on March 10, 2026, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the State of Rhode Island in a negligence action arising from a slip‑and‑fall in a public restroom at Scarborough South State Beach. The Court held that the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that the state willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, and therefore the state was immune from liability under Rhode Island’s Recreational Use Statute (RUS), G.L. 1956 chapter 6 of title 32.

Factual Background

Scarborough South State Beach is a state‑owned public beach in Narragansett maintained by the Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM). On August 31, 2014, after spending the day at the beach with his family, Louis Campagnone entered the men’s restroom using a cane. As he walked into the bathroom, his cane slipped, causing him to fall and sustain injuries to the left side of his body, including his hip, face, elbow, knee, shoulder, and ankle. He was transported by EMS to South County Hospital, where he was diagnosed with a fractured hip.

Mr. Campagnone filed suit in December 2015, alleging that he slipped as a result of an accumulation of sand and water on the restroom floor. He claimed the state breached its duty by: (1) negligently allowing the bathroom to remain in a dangerous condition; (2) failing to warn of that condition; and (3) failing to clean or maintain the bathroom to avoid such a condition. He sought damages for personal injuries, medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, and lost earning capacity. After Mr. Campagnone’s death from unrelated causes in 2022, his daughter and court‑appointed administrator, Dana Martinelli, was substituted, and an amended complaint was filed in the name of the Estate.

Procedural History

Following approximately three years of discovery, the state moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under the RUS and, alternatively, the public duty doctrine. In support, the state relied on deposition testimony from a RIDEM regional manager and a park ranger at Scarborough, both of whom denied any knowledge of prior injuries in the Scarborough bathrooms.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that factual issues existed as to whether the state breached its duty in a manner that triggered the statutory exception to the RUS and that the public duty doctrine did not apply. The plaintiff submitted, among other things, a newspaper article discussing unclean conditions at state beach restrooms and a 2018 RIDEM study on state parks.

The Superior Court justice initially reserved decision to allow further discovery. Plaintiff later supplemented the record with the deposition of a RIDEM associate administrator, the beach operations manual for Rhode Island state parks, and emails from beach patrons between 2016 and 2020 complaining about bathroom cleanliness at Scarborough. None of these materials reflected prior slip‑and‑fall injuries in the bathrooms, and the RIDEM witness testified she had no knowledge of incidents involving people slipping and falling in the Scarborough bathrooms between 2014 and 2019.

On November 21, 2023, the trial justice issued a bench decision granting summary judgment to the state. The court held that the RUS applies broadly to landowners who open their land free of charge for recreational use and that there were no disputed material facts. Focusing on the state’s duty and knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to show that the state had the requisite notice of a dangerous condition in the Scarborough restroom to invoke the statutory exception to immunity. The court did not reach the public duty doctrine. Final judgment entered for the state on July 2, 2024, and the Estate appealed.

Analysis

The RUS limits the liability of landowners who permit members of the public to use their property for recreational purposes. Under § 32‑6‑5(a)(1), an exception exists "[f]or the willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity after discovering the user's peril." The Court has previously defined "willful" as voluntary and intentional and "malicious" as conduct substantially certain to cause injury. Unless a landowner’s conduct rises to this level, immunity applies.

The Court contrasted the case before it with its earlier decision in Berman v. Sitrin, in which evidence of latent dangers, a history of serious injuries and deaths, and repeated documented warnings to the governmental defendant could support a finding of willful or malicious failure to warn. In Berman, the government entity had actual or constructive knowledge of perilous conditions and failed to rectify them despite reasonable opportunity.

Applying these principles, the Court determined that the Estate failed to present evidence that could create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the state willfully or maliciously failed to warn of a dangerous condition in the Scarborough restroom.

After nearly eight years of discovery, the Estate could not identify any evidence that:

• the state had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition in the Scarborough bathrooms;
• there were prior complaints about the bathroom floors being slippery; or
• there were any prior injuries or accidents involving the bathroom floors.
  
  

The materials the plaintiff relied upon—RIDEM cleaning policies, the absence of documentation showing the men’s restroom was cleaned on the day of the incident, general reports and articles about unclean conditions at state beach bathrooms, and post‑2014 emails complaining about cleanliness—did not establish the state’s actual or constructive knowledge of a specific dangerous condition in the Scarborough restroom that caused Mr. Campagnone’s fall. At most, they suggested general notice of potentially hazardous conditions, which the Court held is insufficient to overcome the presumption of immunity under the RUS.

The Court rejected the Estate’s argument that inadequate or inconsistent recordkeeping by the state explained the absence of direct evidence, reiterating that the plaintiff bears the burden of producing competent evidence of a disputed material fact. The Court emphasized that it is not its role to infer governmental obfuscation from an absence of records; rather, the question is whether the Estate presented evidence that could support a finding of willful or malicious conduct under the statute. It had not.

Legislative Concerns and Impact

In a concluding footnote, the Court again invited the General Assembly to revisit the RUS as it pertains to public land to which the public is expressly invited. The Court observed that, as currently written, the statute affords government defendants complete immunity in a broad category of negligence cases, often resulting in dismissal at the summary‑judgment stage. The Court noted that this result can be in tension with traditional conceptions of the jury’s role as factfinder and may diminish the state’s incentives to act as a responsible landowner, but emphasized that any change must come from the legislature, not the judiciary.

This decision reinforces the broad immunity granted to landowners, including the state, under Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute when property is opened to the public for recreational purposes free of charge. The Court emphasized that, absent evidence of willful or malicious conduct or specific notice of a dangerous condition, plaintiffs face significant hurdles in pursuing negligence claims for injuries occurring on such public lands. The ruling also highlights the Court's ongoing concern about the scope of the statute, noting its effect in barring entire categories of negligence cases at the summary judgment stage and calling on the legislature to reconsider the statute as it applies to public land.